



DEEP LEARNING ON GRAPHS WITH DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY

Sina Sajadmanesh


Idiap Research Institute

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne (EPFL)


Joint work with Ali Shahin Shamsabadi, Aurélien Bellet, and Daniel Gatica-Perez

Sony AI PPML Job Talk, May 2023


GRAPHS ARE UBIQUITOUS



Knowledge Graphs





Molecules



Social Networks

GRAPH NEURAL NETWORKS

- ▶ We need to learn representation of nodes in a low-dimensional space
 - Similar nodes in the graph should be mapped close to each other in the embedding space
- ▶ Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are **state-of-the-art** representation learning algorithms for graphs.



- ▶ Graph data could be **privacy-sensitive**
 - e.g., social relationships, financial transactions, medical/biological networks, ...

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
We need privacy-preserving machine learning algorithms for graph data!

DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY FOR GRAPHS

Differential Privacy [Dwork et al., 2006]

Randomized algorithm A is ϵ -DP if for all **neighboring** graphs $G \simeq G'$ and all sets of outputs S :

$$\Pr[A(G) \in S] \leq e^\epsilon \Pr[A(G') \in S]$$



- ▶ **Edge-Level DP**

Neighboring graphs differ by at most **one edge**

- ▶ **Node-Level DP**

Neighboring graphs differ by at most **one node** (and all adjacent edges)

GRAPH NEURAL NETWORKS

A: Adjacency matrix

X: Input node features

Y: Predicted node labels


$\mathbf{H}^{(i)}$: Hidden node representations of layer i

AGG: Aggregation function

- e.g., summation: $\mathbf{AGG}(\mathbf{H}, \mathbf{A}) = \mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{H}$

UPD: Learnable update function

- e.g., an MLP



▶ Exploding Sensitivity

- With a K -layer GNN, each node affects the embedding of all the nodes in its K -hop neighborhood
- $O(D^K)$ gradient terms change at once (D is maximum degree)

DP GNN CHALLENGES: WHY NOT DP-SGD?

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DP-SGD cannot be directly applied to GNNs

OUR APPROACH: AGGREGATION PERTURBATION

- ▶ **Aggregation Perturbation:** adding noise to output of the aggregation step
 - Prevents the exploding sensitivity problem by composing differentially private aggregation steps
 - Ensures inference privacy

OUR APPROACH: AGGREGATION PERTURBATION


- ▶ **Aggregation Perturbation:** adding noise to output of the aggregation step
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 - Every forward pass of the model consumes privacy budget
 - The excessive noise results in poor performance

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
*We decouple the aggregation operations from the model parameters
to maintain the privacy budget*

GNN WITH AGGREGATION PERTURBATION (GAP)




ADVANTAGES OF GAP ARCHITECTURE

✓ Edge-level DP




ADVANTAGES OF GAP ARCHITECTURE

- ✓ Edge-level DP
- ✓ Node-level DP through combination with DP-SGD
 - For bounded-degree graphs




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- ✓ Multi-hop aggregations



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- ✓ Edge-level DP
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 - For bounded-degree graphs
- ✓ Multi-hop aggregations
- ✓ Zero-cost inference privacy



EXPERIMENT SETTINGS


- ▶ **Task:** Node Classification
- ▶ **Baselines:** MLP, GraphSAGE

DATASET	CLASSES	NODES	EDGES	FEATURES	MED. DEGREE
FACEBOOK	6 YEAR	26,406 USER	2,117,924 FRIENDSHIP	501	62
REDDIT	8 COMMUNITY	116,713 POST	46,233,380 MUTUAL USER	602	209
AMAZON	10 CATEGORY	1,790,731 PRODUCT	80,966,832 MUTUAL PURCHASE	100	22


Accuracy of Non-Private Methods

METHOD	FACEBOOK	REDDIT	AMAZON
GAP- ∞	80.0 \pm 0.48	99.4 \pm 0.02	91.2 \pm 0.07
SAGE- ∞	83.2 \pm 0.68	99.1 \pm 0.01	92.7 \pm 0.09

EDGE-LEVEL DP ACCURACY-PRIVACY TRADE-OFF



NODE-LEVEL DP ACCURACY-PRIVACY TRADE-OFF



Mean AUC of node-level membership inference attack.

DATASET	METHOD	$\epsilon = 1$	$\epsilon = 2$	$\epsilon = 4$	$\epsilon = 8$	$\epsilon = 16$	$\epsilon = \infty$
FACEBOOK	GAP-NDP	50.16	50.25	50.61	51.11	52.66	81.67
REDDIT	GAP-NDP	50.04	50.39	51.20	52.23	52.54	54.97
AMAZON	GAP-NDP	50.06	50.23	50.54	51.53	51.72	66.68




- ▶ GNNs leak private information
 - They are vulnerable to privacy attacks
- ▶ Implementing DP in GNNs is challenging
 - Exploding sensitivity
 - Inference privacy
- ▶ Our Differentially Private GNN: GAP
 - Ensures both edge-level and node-level DP
 - Supports multi-hop aggregations
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THANK YOU !




Questions?







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EFFECT OF THE NUMBER OF HOPS



EFFECT OF THE ENCODER MODULE



EFFECT OF THE MAXIMUM DEGREE

